Social interest: Adlerian
Psychology in the context of constructivist and humanistic
theories
Ursula Oberst,
Ph.D.
Associate Professor
Department of Psychology
Ramon Llull University
c/ Císter, 34
08022 Barcelona (Spain)
Email:
ursulao@blanquerna.url.es
Alan E. Stewart,
Ph.D.
Associate Professor
The
University of Georgia
Department of Counseling & Human Development
402
Aderhold Hall
Athens,
Georgia 30602-7142
Email:
aeswx@uga.edu
Alfred Adler’s Individual Psychology (IP) is traditionally
considered a psychoanalytic or “in-depth” approach.
Similarities with psychodynamic schools notwithstanding,
this paper considers that Individual Psychology has many
similarities with other theoretical orientations in
psychology and psychotherapy, which appeared following the
emergence of psychoanalysis and IP, for example cognitive
psychotherapy, humanistic and constructivist theories. In
this paper, we will discuss IP within the frame of
constructivist and humanistic metatheory. We consider that
this discussion is not a theoretical exercise of little
practical significance. On the contrary, we think that it
can have important implications for counselling and therapy
practice.
The challenge of integration in psychotherapy
In order to survive and to develop along productive lines,
all psychotherapy approaches have to face the challenge of
two current tendencies in psychotherapy: that of integration
with other theories and that of constructivist metatheory.
The proliferation of different schools of psychotherapy on
one hand and the notion that there is not one exclusively
efficient technical procedure in therapy on the other has
led to various attempts to integrate different approaches
into a broader system. This effort after integration often
poses the question of: what are the elements shared by
diverse therapies that have been shown as effective
strategies and techniques for change? There are many
different perspectives among the scientific community; with
respect to IP, the most important integration theories can
be summarized by the following:
Purism
represents the most conservative standpoint; for Adlerian
Psychology, this would mean to preserve the theory “as it
is” and to only maintain the classical tenets without
admitting innovative, though theoretically consistent,
features stemming from other approaches. Technical
eclecticism represents a spurious picking out of what
are considered the best (i.e. most effective) techniques of
other therapies and applying them, under the name of
Adlerian therapy. Theoretical integration would mean
the fusion of Adlerian theory with other theories of and, in
the extreme case, becoming a “hyphenated approach” (see
Carlson, 2000), e.g. a “narrative-Adlerian”.
Meta-theoretical integration (e.g. Neimeyer’s 1988
concept of Theoretically Progressive Integration) is an
approach that proposes the integration of different
psychotherapies that are epistemologically compatible in
order to “cross-fertilize” each other. As we have outlined
elsewhere (Oberst & Stewart, 2002), it is our position that
Adlerian Psychology could be put under the umbrella of a
specific meta-theory or epistemology, and benefit from the
commonalities with other approaches, incorporate innovative
techniques, and also inform these other approaches with
respect to theory and practices.
Constructivism and post-modern thought
In the strictest sense, constructivism is not a psychology
but an epistemic standpoint (i.e., a theory of knowledge),
the basic postulate of which implies that it is the observer
who actively construes his or her knowledge of the world and
that reality can be interpreted in different ways. Realities
(“facts”) are not discovered but rather constructed, in the
sense that Reality is not the real world “out there”, but
only our mental construction in terms of our previous
experiences and meaning structures. And perception is not an
act that allows us to know and to represent reality as Kelly
(1955/1991) asserted, but it is a construing act. In this
sense, our perception seldom gives us an objective image of
an ontological reality (“the world as it is”), and thus, may
rarely offer us the “Truth” about it.
Things become clearer when we compare constructivism to its
traditional opposite, objectivism. Following Botella’s
(1994) suggestion, we can use four criteria in order to
compare both approaches: view of human being, view of the
world, conception of human knowledge, and nature of
justification. In the traditional objectivist viewpoint, the
human being is viewed as reactive, passive, and
determined by circumstances. Constructivism, alternatively,
sees the human being as pro-active, goal-directed and in a
dialectical relationship with the material and social
environment. In objectivism, the world view is
mechanistic and subject to causality, while in
constructivism it is organicist and contextualist. The
conception of human knowledge in objectivism has been
described as accumulative fragmentalism by George Kelly
(1955/1991), the first author who formally introduced
constructivism in a complex psychological theory. This
expression means that accumulating more and more knowledge
facts about the world we gradually come to an ever better
understanding of it. As a consequence, the nature of
justification is the truth value of knowledge claims.
Our knowledge of the world is valid if it is correct,
objective and represents the Truth. According to Kelly, from
the constructivist epistemic viewpoint, knowledge is not
simply the progressive accumulation of isolated facts;
instead, facts about reality can be weighted
differentially to allow multiple, adaptive perspectives on
the same person, event or object in the world. Kelly called
this flexibility in meaning-making constructive
alternativism. This means that there is also no
absolute Truth about reality, but only the pragmatic value
of our claims. In psychological terms this also means that,
according to Kelly, the human being creates “constructs” (a
concept very similar to Vaihinger’s and Adler’s “fictions”)
and tries to adapt them to reality. The adjustment is not
always perfect, but without these constructs (or fictions)
we would be unable to find meaning in the world. Kelly
writes:
“"We
take the stand that there are always some alternative
constructions available to choose among in dealing with the
world. No one needs to paint himself into a corner; no one
needs to be completely hemmed in by circumstances; no one
needs to be the victim of his biography. We call this
philosophical position constructive alternativism."
(Kelly 1955/1991, p. 11)
Some theorists claim that constructivism is the most
adequate epistemic position in a post-modern world.
Postmodernism (or postmodernity) is considered to be the
contemporary cultural condition of the developed
post-industrial societies. It is thought that this
postmodern turn is a consequence of the increasing
dissatisfaction with the project of modernity with its
rationalist concepts and its belief in the values of
Enlightenment, such as Reason, Truth, Progress, Science,
etc. In postmodernism, these beliefs in universal values
have been replaced by a progressively relativist attitude:
incredulity, ambivalence, and disbelief (Botella 1995).
Postmodern thought has even been associated with a mentality
of “anything goes”: any artistic, philosophical, political,
etc. expression or standpoint is as valid as any other, none
is better or preferable (MacKay, 2003). As basic themes of
postmodern thought, Polkinghorne (1992) identifies four
aspects: foundationlessness (as we have no direct access to
reality, we have no sure epistemological foundation upon
which knowledge can be built), fragmentariness (the real is
a disunited, fragmented accumulation of disparate elements
and events, so knowledge claims should be concerned not with
the search of context-free laws, but with these local and
specific occurrences), constructivism (knowledge is not a
mirrored reflection of reality, but a construction built
from cognitive processes), and neopragmatism: given the
three other aspects, the only valid criterion for accepting
a knowledge claim is not its correspondence with the
inaccessible reality, but its predictive usefulness for
guiding human action to fulfil intended purposes.
Adlerian Psychology as a constructivist theory
Several authors have already identified the constructivist
elements in Adlerian Psychology or even re-define it as a
constructivist theory (Master, 1991, Shulman & Watts, 1997,
Oberst, 1998; Oberst & Stewart, 2002). Adler can be clearly
considered as an early constructivist because of his
reliance upon Vaihinger (1925). If we analyze Adlerian
Psychology with respect to the four criteria of
constructivist psychology, we can state the following: With
his ideas of goal-directedness, social-embeddedness,
pro-activeness, tendentious apperception, the creative self
and, especially, the notion of fictions, Adler’s view of
the human being as well as his world view can
clearly be considered as constructivist. With respect to the
conception of knowledge, the quotation above from
Kelly (1955/1991, p.11) could stem from Adler. For Adler,
individuals always have the possibility to respond
alternatively to their experiences (Adler’s notion of the
“opinion”). Adler suggests in a quite constructivist way:
“No experience is a cause of success or failure. We do not
suffer from the shock of our experiences – the so-called
trauma – but we make out of them just what suits our
purposes. We are self-determined by the meaning we give to
our experiences, and there is probably always something of a
mistake involved when we take particular experiences as the
basis for our future life. Meanings are not determined by
situations, but we determine ourselves by the meaning we
give to situations.”
(Adler, in Ansbacher and Ansbacher, 1955 , p. 208)
Thus, we have no problem in classifying the Adlerian
conception of knowledge as constructivist.
Social interest and Constructivism
The difficulties arise when it comes to the nature of
justification. As we have said, constructivism claims that
there is no absolute Truth and therefore no universal
ethical principle that could guide our moral acts. But Adler
does seem to have the idea of the existence of a general
principle, capable to distinguish true from false, right
from wrong, psychologically healthy from neurotic: that of
social interest. Whereas in the realm of personality, with
its notions of fictions and fictionate goals, holism,
proactivity, social embeddedness, etc., IP can be considered
constructivist, the concept of social interest versus
striving for superiority as criterion for mental health
clearly does not contribute to the constructivist view of
IP. For constructivists, the criteria of truth are only our
own fictions, therefore Truth itself cannot exist. Instead
of Truth, Botella (1995) proposes the pragmatic value of our
knowledge claims, their predictive efficiency, their
viability and fertility. In other words, their usefulness.
But Adler has a different concept of “usefulness”, which
extends beyond individual knowing and individuals goals:
while (neo-)pragmatic usefulness refers to the practical
value of successfully helping individual to fulfil their
intended purposes (Polkinghorne 1992), Adler’s view of
usefulness refers much more broadly to social
interest—orienting towards others to a greater or lesser
extent. Adler’s meanings for useful (“nützlich”)
extend more broadly to include those thoughts, attitudes and
behaviours that are useful for an individual’s sense of
adaptation and belonging within the community as well as for
the community as a whole.
Thus, if “anything goes”, it may be acceptable and highly
“useful” (pragmatic) to kill your hated mother-in-law and
get away with her money. Constructivism has no answer to
this dilemma, because it is epistemologically neutral to
moral values. In a pragmatical sense, it may even be useful
to behave in a prosocial way, because of the advantages that
getting along well with other confers to the individual
(because the other people may return you a favour or because
it allows you to feel morally
superior, etc.). In the Adlerian sense, usefulness has a
connotation that goes beyond the utilitarian idea of “it’s
good to be good, because then people will be good to me”. In
its strictest interpretation, for Adler it is not acceptable
to behave in a prosocial or altruistic way in order to be
returned the favor or in order to feel “morally good”, as
this attitude can be interpreted as an expression of
striving for power and therefore, as a lack of social
interest.
Some constructivist authors (e.g. Botella and Figueras,
1995) point out that constructivism confers to the
individual precisely the personal responsibility for his or
her acts, because the gradual loss of the existent
legitimating systems (e.g. Philosophy, Religion, political
theories) in postmodernity denies him or her the commodity
and the security of a universally valid principle. In
contrast, Adler does claim a universal criterion for truth.
Some of Adler's writings seem quite objectivist and Adler
himself often seems convinced of being in possession of
knowing what is right and what is wrong. Not only does he
qualify some cognitions as "erroneous" (which implies the
existence of a correct point of view), but also as
"antisocial" cognitions (which implies even a value-laden
standpoint).
In some of Adler’s publications, the concept of social
interest sounds like an absolute, eternal, and universal
truth (“the iron logic of social life”). In their
interpretation, Ansbacher and Ansbacher (1956), Adler’s
"absolute truth” only expresses his conviction that human
beings in their interactions with other people need a
reference point for their orientation, therefore social
interest itself would be only a fiction, maybe the most
pragmatic one, or, in Vaihinger’s terms: the most expedient
error. Oberst & Stewart (2002) have discussed in detail how
the concept of social interest could be interpreted or
re-interpreted in constructivist terms; but the
constructivist nature or not of social interest remains
controversial.
Adlerian Psychology and humanistic theories
As Neimeyer and Stewart (1999) already stated, Adler’s view
of the human being, his orientation away from an exclusive
intrapsychic determinism, the adoption of Vaihinger’s idea
of fictions, etc. allow us to see Individual Psychology as a
first approximation of constructivism in psychology and
psychotherapy. From Adler’s bibliography we can appreciate
the evolution of his personal epistemological standpoint and
learn how the young Adler (before World War II) struggled to
free himself from Psychoanalysis and the medical model, and
how the adult Adler elaborated an innovative and early
constructivist theory. In contrast, the mature Adler
(approximately from 1925 on) seems to turn his back on some
of his theoretical constructivist standpoints for the sake
of his humanistic and sometimes even missionary desire to
improve the psychological conditions of mankind and the
living together of people. Some scholars believed that this
turn in Adler’s focus and energies stemmed from his
experiences as a physician in the military during World War
I (Hoffman (1994). Adler was intrigued by the possibilities
of the potential welfare and wellbeing that could be
achieved if the destructive capabilities of nations were
redirected for communitarian purposes. Thus, at the
threshold of postmodernism, Adler decided to take an
alternate path from an otherwise direct course towards
postmodernism to follow a course instead that embraced a
humanistic world-view.
The similarities of Adlerian Psychology and humanistic
theories have been pointed out earlier (Birnbaum, 1961;
Ellis, 1970; Frankl, 1970; Maslow, 1979 Dreyfus & Nikelly,
1979; see also Oberst & Stewart, 2002). The humanistic
aspects of Adlerian theory refer mainly to such concepts
like the therapist attitudes, the view of people being
inherently good, the idea of people striving for personal
improvement and being endowed of a free will and therefore
being responsible for their acts. And of course, social
interest occupies a key role in this therapeutic approach.
If we accept with Adler the idea of social interest as being
a) the sense of life (“the goal of pursuing the welfare of
all mankind”; Adler, 1933), b) the (unattainable) goal of
perfection c) the ethical criterion for mental health, then
the concept of social interest takes on a humanistic
colouring.
Adler’s embrace of a humanistic orientation in discussing
the nature of social interest as attitudes and behaviours
that demonstrate care for others may seem to some
psychologists as quaintly-dated in the face of economic
globalization over the last decade. Unprecedented levels of
competition exist among people, communities, corporations,
and even nations as these entities seek positions of
economic security or excellence. This climate in
westernized cultures, especially in the United States with
its emphasis on American exceptionalism, makes postmodernism
or constructivism particularly appealing approach insofar as
one’s epistemology can serve one’s motives. In this
climate, it may seem self-defeating or strategically
disadvantageous to think of another in a socially-interested
way or to behave in a manner that makes one less
competitive, and so forth. To encourage people (clients) to
enact social interest in this manner may even smack of
imposing the therapists’ value system on the client.
Although asserting the existence or iron logic of
social interest may seem to transgress constructivist
assumptions regarding the know-ability of the world and
peoples’ abilities to act upon this knowledge in a
value-free manner, it is a given that humans must coexist
with each other. The reality that all people must respond to
the social—to find a way to conceptualize and respond to
other—cannot be dealt with by assuming that a real world or
the truth (the social included) simply does not exist.
Finding a way to peacefully and productively coexist not
only has survival value but can be of immense psychological
value as the vast literature on social support has
documented (e. g., Folkman & Lazarus, 1980;
Uchino, Cacioppo, Kiecolt-Glaser, 1996; Yoshikawa, 1994).
Social interest: humanistic by nature, constructivist in
conception and essence
How can we reconcile the humanistic essence of social
interest with a constructivist epistemic concerning the view
of the world and of the human being? Social interest and
its humanistic essence embrace constructivism in at least
two ways: 1. in conceiving of what is a healthy and
productive stance towards other people, and 2. how this
conception is enacted behaviourally. With respect to the
former, one need only to consider what may be of help or use
to another (or to the community) and to consider what one
wishes to accomplish (i. e., what are the goals or
motives)? Each person can develop his or her own unique
approach to these tasks of life without having to consult or
uncritically adopt the value system of another. For any
person’s particular conceptualisation of social interest,
there may be many ways to enact it, again without adhering
to a single objectively-defined standard. The viability of
a person’s conception and enactment of social interest
ultimately can be evaluated by how others receive it. Here,
people may differ in how receive another person’s offering
of social interest (i. e., assessing the act and attempting
to discern motives). Overall, myriad ways exist for people
to find some way of orienting towards others such
that they experience the psychological benefits (i. e.,
health according to Adler) that attends a sense of belonging
(Baumeister & Leary). According to Adler the individual
exercises a high degree of creativity and uniqueness to
construct a viable orientation towards others—there is no
one right way to do this. What might this look like in
therapeutic practice? First, although the therapist knows
of the significance of developing social interest, the
tentative and client-oriented approach characteristic of
Individual Psychology precludes the therapist adopting a
directive, objectivist stance in steering the client towards
an outwardly-supplied objective. Instead the therapist
helps the client to come to his or her own conclusions
regarding the viability and adaptability of his or her
interpersonal manoeuvres (i. e., attention-getting,
attempting to dominate others, etc.). Many alternative
approaches may be tried before the client discovers that
moving towards others in a cooperative, interested, and
benevolent manner yields results that are beneficial. In
some cases the Adlerian therapist will test hypotheses about
a client’s motives, behaviours, or the outcomes of
interpersonal transactions. Suggesting alternatives along
these lines does not necessarily render the therapy
objectivist. Rather, the way in which the therapist’s
experience of the client is offered, the process and timing
components, affect how it is received and whether the client
is more likely to experience it as an authoritarian
prescription that precludes the client making his or her own
meanings.
Conclusion
As a conclusion of the abovementioned challenges -
integration in psychotherapy and constructivism - the
authors of this paper want to present their personal
perspectives on the metatheoretical assignment of IP:
We consider neither purism nor fusing with other theories as
a valid option for the future of Individual Psychology. On
one hand, we propose to preserve the Adlerian essence: its
view of psychological problems (“neurosis”) as a consequence
of the self-defeating attempts at compensating inferiority
feelings by striving for superiority; its view of neurosis
as an excuse for not adaptively and productively interacting
with others (i. e., demonstrating social interest), which is
a goal of the neurotic symptoms; its view of social interest
as an innate positive tendency in the individual that has to
be fostered in early childhood; its claim for fomenting
social interest in therapy as an important element of
healing. We propose to keep the Adlerian commitment to an
ethical stance and to a humanistic attitude. On the other
hand, we want to encourage Adlerian psychologist to explore
the constructivist view of human being and of human
knowledge and its many possibilities of applying new points
of view and innovative therapy techniques stemming from
other (constructivist) psychotherapies. In this sense, we
also encourage the investigation with respect to
meta-theoretical cross-fertilization in order to develop
innovative and effective therapy techniques.
Beyond theoretical questions and practical applications in
psychotherapy, Adlerians have always viewed Individual
Psychology not only as a psychotherapy approach but also as
a theory that can address the questions of social living. In
this sense, we consider that the Adlerian commitment for an
ethical stance may be a valid option for individuals, if we
understand social interest in the sense a socially shared
fiction and not an absolute truth somebody possesses by
virtue of being an Adlerian psychologist. In this sense,
social interest can represent a conscious and responsible
act in face of relativism. Here is precisely a new
opportunity for Adlerian Psychology within a constructivist
and post-modern framework: to explore to which degree social
interest can become an acceptable answer to the ethical
questions that emerge from the post-modern condition.
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Authors’ note:
part of this article is based on the conference given by U.
Oberst at the
23rd Congress of the International Association of Individual
Psychology. Torino, Italia, 26-29 de mayo de 2005. Which
kind of Adlerian Psychology?: Adlerian Psychotherapy and its
relation to constructivism and humanistic therapies.
Copyright ©
2005 International Association of Individual
Psychology
